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In evolutionary perspective, what is most remarkable about human sociality is its many and diverse forms of cooperation. Here, I
provide an overview of some recent research, mostly from our laboratory, comparing human children with their nearest living
relatives, the great apes, in various tests of collaboration, prosocial behavior, conformity, and group-mindedness (e.g., following
and enforcing social norms). This is done in the context of a hypothetical evolutionary scenario comprising two ordered steps: a
first step in which early humans began collaborating with others in unique ways in their everyday foraging and a second step in
which modern humans began forming cultural groups. Humans’ unique forms of sociality help to explain their unique forms of
cognition and morality. © 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.It is commonplace to refer to Homo sapiens as “the social
animal” (e.g., Aronson, 1980). But many animal species are
social, in many different ways, and so, it is not always clear
exactly what this appellation means.
Recent theory and research in evolutionary psychology and
anthropology have helped to specify more precisely the ways
in which human beings are especially social. Briefly said,
humans are especially cooperative. Somewhat analogous to
the way that bees and ants are especially cooperative among
insects, humans are especially cooperative among mammals
and other primates (Wilson, 2012). Bee and ant ultra-sociality
is based in kin selection and the special way that members of
the same colony are genetically interrelated. Human ultra-
sociality, in contrast, is based in some special psychological
mechanisms—both cognitive and motivational—that have
evolved to support humans’ ultra-cooperative lifeways.
In this brief overview, I provide one possible evolutionary
account of how humans became ultra-cooperative. As evi-
dence for this account, I review recent research comparing
the skills and motivations for cooperation of young human
children and their nearest primate relatives, the great apes. I
conclude with some speculations about how humans’ special
skills and motivations for cooperation have helped to create
their unique forms of cognition and morality.PRIMATE BACKGROUNDAs most mammals, the vast majority of primate species live in
social groups. For the individual, the evolutionary basis of*Correspondence to: Michael Tomasello, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary A
E-mail: tomas@eva.mpg.de
1Humans are members of the great ape clade, along with orangutans, gorillas, chi
closest living relatives, the split having occurred roughly 6 million years ago (the
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for comgroup living is enhanced protection against predation. But
the intimacy of social life also brings with it increased compe-
tition for resources. Individuals compete with others in their
social group for food, for example, by either scrambling to
get to it first or else contesting others directly, which has led
to the prevalence of dominance hierarchies as a way for both
parties to avoid potentially damaging fights.
In this context, in many mammalian species, individuals
cooperate with one another in order to better compete for re-
sources. Among primates, such coalitions (potentially turning
into more long-term alliances) are especially prevalent and
require sophisticated skills of social cognition for maintaining
simultaneously two social relationships of different natures
(Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). To maintain these cooperation-
for-competition relationships, individuals curry favor with
their best partners, for example, by engaging inmutual grooming
or, less frequently, in food sharing (Muller & Mitani, 2005).
One reasonable characterization is thus that the vast majority of
nonhuman primate cooperation is in the context of intragroup
competition (or else intergroup competition, as coalitions form
to attack intruders from neighboring groups or to mob potential
predators). This means that processes of social selection are, in
a sense, working against the evolution of cooperation in these
species, as individuals who are given favorable treatment by con-
specifics are those who are best at competition and dominance.
Importantly, intragroup competition for food (and also for
sexual partners) is a zero-sum game independent of whether
individuals act alone or together. All individuals and coalitions
are competing for one and the same fixed set of resources.
There is one major exception, and it involves humans’ closest
living relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos.1 Both speciesnthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, D 04103, Leipzig, Germany.
mpanzees, and bonobos. The latter two, both from the genus Pan, are humans’
two Pan species then split roughly 2 million years ago).
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keys. Although the observations are sparse for bonobos, for
chimpanzees, we have a large body of data from several different
social groups living in different parts of equatorial Africa
(Boesch & Boesch-Acherman, 2000). The key point for current
purposes is that in most cases, these monkeys cannot be captured
by an individual acting alone. Some form of cooperation is re-
quired, and cooperators gain access to resources not available
to non-cooperators. The basic process is one in which one male
chimpanzee gives chase, and then others in the area go to likely
escape routes, thus surrounding the monkey. In the end, one
chimpanzee actually makes the capture, and then in most cases,
they all manage to eat at least something.
These observations of Pan suggest that humans’ last com-
mon ancestor with other primates foraged for small mammals
cooperatively. But human foragers do things differently: their
collaborative foraging is much more cooperatively structured,
as are many other dimensions of their daily lives (Tomasello,
2011). As just two examples, they help one another when
hunting, and they share the food with everyone in the social
group. To account for such differences, Tomasello, Melis,
Tennie, Wyman, and Herrmann (2012) proposed a two-step
evolutionary sequence leading to humans’ species-unique
forms of cooperation. The first step was new ways of collabo-
rating in foraging, perhaps due to ecological changes that
severely reduced or eliminated food sources that individuals
could obtain on their own. It was collaborate or die. The
second step was a scaling up of the collaboration of two or a
few individuals to collaboration among all of the members of
a more or less large social (cultural) group, perhaps due to in-
creased competition with other human groups. It was identify
and collaborate with our social—indeed cultural—group or
submit to the invading hordes from the other side of the moun-
tain. This means that the sense of belonging to a social group
characteristic of contemporary humans has two evolutionary
bases (which, interestingly, correspond quite well to the two
bases most often proposed by social psychologists; e.g.,
Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007): interdependent collabo-
ration, as the more basic, and group-minded (perhaps cultural)
identification built on that foundation.
A main source of evidence for this evolutionary account
(given that behavior does not fossilize) comes from the ontog-
eny of humans’ skills and motivations for cooperation and
how they compare to those of our nearest great ape relatives.
We may make this comparison most usefully in terms of our
two proposed evolutionary steps, succinctly: collaboration
and culture.COLLABORATION2Because chimpanzees actively share food only rarely, their apparatus was a
bit different: if the lucky individual wanted to protect her bounty, she could
do so, but if she did nothing, the other could take some. “Sharing” in the case
of chimpanzees, then, meant not protecting their food from the partner.Chimpanzee group hunting of monkeys and human collabora-
tive foraging both fit within the general framework of the Stag
Hunt from game theory: individuals have a safe low-value
option available to them (the “hare”), but if they cooperate,
they can both benefit from a higher value option (the “stag”).
For cooperation to become an evolutionarily stable strategy
in this situation, three basic challenges must be met: (i) to keep
everyone incentivized over time, there must be a way of© 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnsharing the spoils that is mutually satisfactory to all; (ii) to
make sure that no one incurs inordinate risk in leaving their
hare toward no good end, there must be some way of coordi-
nating decisions; and (iii) to make sure that everyone is incen-
tivized to put in collaborative work, free riders (cheaters) must
be excluded from the spoils.
Small groups of male chimpanzees successfully hunt mon-
keys, as noted, and this is stable over time, and so, they clearly
have ways of meeting these challenges. But in each case, the
way that they do it is different from the way that humans—
even young human children—do it.
Sharing the Spoils
In chimpanzee group hunting of monkeys, many different indi-
viduals get somemeat from a captured monkey carcass. The rea-
son is that even if the captor is dominant, he cannot monopolize
the carcass himself because it is too big. As with social carni-
vores like lions and wolves, trying to protect a large carcass with
other hungry individuals approaching is a losing battle. After the
kill, non-captors harass the captor and obtain pieces of meat
from the too-big-to-monopolize carcass, with those who harass
most getting the most meat (Gilby, 2006). The process looks
much more like food competition than a dividing of spoils.
The difference with humans may be seen quite clearly in a
recent matched pair of experiments with chimpanzees and
human children. Melis, Hare, and Tomasello (2006) presented
pairs of chimpanzees with out-of-reach food on a platform that
could be obtained only if both individuals pulled simulta-
neously on the two ends of a rope. When there were two piles
of food, one in front of each individual, the pair often collabo-
rated successfully. However, when there was only one pile
of food in the middle of the platform, pulling it in often
resulted in the dominant individual monopolizing all of the
food. This naturally demotivated the subordinate for future
collaboration with this individual, and so, cooperation fell apart
over trials. Chimpanzees’ predominant solution to food compe-
tition in general, namely, dominance, undermined the incentive
to cooperate. Warneken, Lohse, Melis, and Tomasello (2011)
presented pairs of 3-year-old human children with the same
basic task. They found that, in contrast to the apes, the children
collaborated readily both when the food was pre-divided and
when it was potentiallymonopolizable, and they did so repeatedly
over multiple trials. On each trial, the children trusted that they
would be able to work out a satisfactory division of spoils at the
end, almost always an equal split.
Using the same board-with-ropes apparatus, Hamann,
Warneken, and Tomasello (2011) investigated more directly
children’s tendency to split the fruits of collaborative labor
equally and how that compared with chimpanzees. They
presented pairs of 3-year-old children and chimpanzees with
three different experimental conditions. In one condition, par-
ticipants simply walked in the room and found three versus
one reward at each end of the apparatus. In this condition, both
children and chimpanzees were selfish: the “lucky” individual
almost never shared with their partner.2 In another condition,Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 187–194 (2014)
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the same asymmetry rewards (3:1). In this condition, the lucky
chimpanzee still almost never shared, and the lucky child
shared only about one third of the time. But in a third condi-
tion, the asymmetrical rewards (3:1) resulted from an equal
collaborative effort from the two participants. In this case,
the lucky chimpanzee still almost never shared, but the lucky
child shared with the unlucky child almost 80% of the time.
The surprising finding is that collaboration engenders equal
sharing in children in a way that it does not in chimpanzees.
These findings suggest that chimpanzees are basically
always competing for food no matter its source. In contrast,
young human children treat resources generated collabora-
tively in special ways, applying some sense of distributive jus-
tice in dividing the spoils. It is possible that these children
have learned social norms or rules about sharing equally from
their parents. But in this case, they should have divided the
food equally in all three of the experimental conditions of
the Hamann et al. (2011) study. It is highly unlikely that par-
ents teach their children to share food equally with a partner
only if they have collaborated in producing it. And so, the
conclusion is that young children have a sense of distributive
justice that is closely tied to collaborative activities.Coordination and Commitment
In a Stag Hunt situation, if an individual can trust that another
individual will be going for the stag, then it is in her interest to
go too (assuming she is confident that the spoils will be shared
in a satisfactory way). Perhaps reflecting their experience of
dominants taking all of the food whenever they can, when
chimpanzees are given the choice of obtaining food by collab-
orating with a partner or acting alone, they most often chose to
act alone. In contrast, young human children most often chose
to collaborate (Bullinger, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; Rekers,
Haun, & Tomasello, 2011).
In another recent study, Bullinger, Wyman, Melis, and
Tomasello (2011) constructed a Stag Hunt situation for pairs
of chimpanzees in which they knew (from pre-training) that
the spoils from the stag would be distributed equally. Thus,
each individual had continual access to a less preferred “hare”
food, which she knew she would lose for good if she left it
(spring-loaded door with lock). Then, a highly preferred “stag”
food appeared that required the pair to work together for
access (which they knew from previous experience). Because
of the risk involved, communicating with the partner, or at
least checking on the partner before forsaking the hare in hand,
would seem to be called for. But what chimpanzees did in this
situation was almost always bolt for the stag (90% of the time
when a partner was present) without communicating or
checking, presumably optimistic that the partner would be
coming also. This is sometimes called a leader–follower strategy.
There was basically no communication with the partner
ahead of time as a way of coordinating their decisions.3 This
is in contrast to 4-year-old children, who engaged in some3Other investigators have also reported a striking lack of communication
among chimpanzees as they engage in collaborative tasks (e.g., Melis, Hare,
& Tomasello, 2009; Povinelli & O’Neill, 2000), including in tasks in which
they had previously communicated with humans (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007).
© 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnkind of communication on almost every trial, often before
leaving their hare (Duguid et al., submitted).
Once humans have made a decision to collaborate, they
seem to form something like a joint goal. To form a joint goal,
we must know together that each of us has the goal of working
with the other (Bratman, 1992). Once they have formed a joint
goal, humans are committed to it. Thus, when their collabora-
tive partner stops interacting with them, even 18-month-old
infants expect her to be committed, and so, they attempt in various
ways to reengage her—as opposed to human-raised chim-
panzees, who just try to find ways to be successful alone
(Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). Slightly older children
understand and respect their own commitment, such that they
keep pursuing the joint goal until both partners have received
their reward even if one receives hers prematurely (Hamann,
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012)—which, again, is not true of
chimpanzees, who bolt as soon as they receive their own
reward (Greenberg, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010).
When 3-year-olds need to break away from a joint commit-
ment with a partner, they even “take leave” through some form
of implicit or explicit communication—as a way of acknowl-
edging and asking to be excused for breaking the commitment
(Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009).
Young children also understand the role of the partner in
the collaborative activity in a way that chimpanzees do not,
and they communicate about roles as well. Thus, when they
are forced to switch roles in a collaborative activity, young
children already know what to do from having observed their
partner earlier from the “other side” of the collaboration—
whereas chimpanzees seemingly do not (Fletcher, Warneken,
& Tomasello, 2012). And even prelinguistic children commu-
nicate with others to help them play their role in a joint activity,
for example, by using a pointing gesture to direct them to
the part of an apparatus they should be acting on—whereas,
once more, chimpanzees do not (Warneken et al., 2006).
Humans, but not chimpanzees, thus seem to comprehend joint
activities and their different roles from a “bird’s eye view” in
which all roles are interchangeable in a single representational
format. This conceptual organization is foundational for every-
thing from bi-directional linguistic conventions to social insti-
tutions with their publicly created joint goals and individual
roles that can be filled by anyone.
Overall, then, we may say that humans coordinate their
decisions in collaborative situations, especially by communica-
tion, in ways that great apes do not. Once they have done so,
they are committed to follow through until everyone gets their
just desserts, again in a way that great apes are not. And cog-
nitively, they seem to understand the collaborative activity as a
dual-level structure of jointness (joint goal and attention) and
individuality (individual roles and perspectives) in ways that
pre-figure the organization of many complex human institu-
tional structures.
Excluding Free Riders
In Stag Hunt situations with no excess of labor available (all
individuals present are needed for success), free riding is not
possible: if I do not participate, then I (and everyone else)
get nothing. The proposal is thus that the earliest manifesta-
tions of human collaborative foraging were not so vulnerableWiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 187–194 (2014)
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collaborators, each of whom believed their participation to be
necessary. Interestingly, contemporary children seem to have
virtually no interest in free riding, as participating in collabora-
tions seems to be rewarding in itself (Gräfenhain et al., 2009).
So, how does it work in chimpanzee hunting of monkeys,
when there are often excess participants around? The answer
is that pretty much everyone around gets plenty of meat.
Boesch (1994) reported that individuals get a bit more meat
when they are actually in the hunt than if they are either
bystanders or latecomers to the party, but bystanders still get
plenty of meat (83% of bystanders get at least some meat),
and they get more than latecomers. This suggests that the main
variable in obtaining meat is proximity to the kill at the key
moment, with the captor getting most, those in the immediate
vicinity getting next most, and latecomers getting least.
This hypothesis is supported by a recent study in which
pairs of chimpanzees again worked with the board-with-ropes
apparatus. The food package (not easily monopolizable) came
to one of the individuals (modeling what happens when one
chimpanzee captures the monkey). In a 2 × 2 experimental
design, the other individual either collaborated or not, and
was either close by (in the same room) or not. Results were
perfectly clear-cut. Whether or not an individual collaborated
was irrelevant to how much food he got. The only thing that
mattered was how close he was to the food when it arrived
(Melis, Schneider, & Tomasello, 2011). In a study designed
to be similar as possible, 3-year-old human children excluded
someone who had previously chosen to engage in another
activity rather than collaborate (Melis, Altricher, Schneider,
& Tomasello, 2013).
It is clear from everyday observations, as well as the study
with children, that humans have negative attitudes toward free
riders who contribute nothing but who expect to share in the
rewards of others’ efforts. Chimpanzees do not like it when
others try to take their food (e.g., Jensen, Call, & Tomasello,
2007), but they do not seem to tie this in any way to the work
contribution of those others. We might thus expect that if early
humans have a choice of partners, they would exclude those
who attempted to minimize their work contribution and maxi-
mize the rewards. This means that less cooperative individuals
would be socially selected against and cooperative individuals
would be socially selected for (Tomasello et al., 2012; see
Boehm, 2012, for a similar hypothesis).
Prosocial Behavior
In the analysis of Tomasello et al. (2012), the emergence of
obligate collaborative foraging in human evolution provided
a new basis for prosocial behavior and helping:
interdependence. The basic idea is that when individuals must
collaborate or die, their partners become very valuable to
them, and so, they must care for them. Within the collaborative
activity, this is obvious. If my partner drops his spear, it is in
my interest to help him fetch it so that we can continue the
collaboration. In addition, if individuals have any sense of
the future, then they should also help any of their potential col-
laborative partners outside of such situations, as they might be
needing them tomorrow. Importantly from a theoretical point
of view, this account is not based on reciprocity; there is no© 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johncost accounting and no contingency of helpful acts on one
another. Interdependence creates a motivation for individuals
to help others for direct fitness benefits.
The “because I might be needing a partner for tomorrow’s
outing” is a part of the evolutionary logic of interdependence,
but it need not be a part of the individual’s proximate mecha-
nism for helping at all. Indeed, in recent experimental
research, even very young children—1- and 2-year-old
toddlers—have been found to be intrinsically motivated to
help other persons almost indiscriminantly. For example,
infants as young as 14months of age will help adults with all
kinds of problems, from fetching out-of-reach objects to
opening doors to stacking books with no concrete reward
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). They do this in a wider
variety of contexts than do chimpanzees, and they also do it
at some cost to themselves (e.g., providing a distressed adult
with a resource that the child values keeping for herself;
Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). Human infants also
provide others with information that they need (e.g., the
location of an object they are seeking) with no external reward
(Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006;
Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, when
young children are given concrete rewards for helping others,
if the rewards are then taken away, their helping actually goes
down (relative to children who were never rewarded in the first
place; Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). In studies of other phe-
nomena, this pattern of results is taken to mean that children
have an intrinsic motivation to do something which the exter-
nal rewards undermine (overjustification effect). Relatedly,
Warneken and Tomasello (2013) found that young children
do not help more when their mother or others are watching
or encouraging them than when they are by themselves.
There is also very good evidence that young children’s
intrinsically motivated helping behavior is underlain by some-
thing like sympathetic concern for the other person. Thus,
Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009) found that when
18-month-old children have sympathetic concern for someone
as measured in their facial expressions—for example, because
she just had her toy destroyed—they subsequently help her
more often than in a neutral condition. Critically, the amount
of sympathetic concern shown for the victim correlates posi-
tively across individuals with their tendency to help her. Even
more dramatically, using a direct physiological measure of
arousal, pupil dilation, Hepach, Vaish, and Tomasello (2013)
found that young children are equally satisfied when they help
someone in need and when they see that person being helped
by a third party—and more satisfied in both of these cases than
when the person is not being helped at all. Young children’s
motivation is not so much to help but to see the other helped.
This means that a concern for self-reputation and reciprocity
cannot be the main motivation for young children’s helping
behavior—because to benefit one’s reputation, one has to per-
form the act oneself.
Overall, then, even young human children seem intrinsically
motivated to help others in many situations. The evolutionary
basis of this prosocial behavior might be the interdependence
of individuals who need one another for foraging success, and
so, they are naturally concerned with each others’ welfare. The
proximate, psychological motivation of individuals, however,
seemingly does not involve considerations of this type; it isWiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 187–194 (2014)
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(a result consistent with Batson’s, 2006, studies with adults).CULTUREThe small-scale, ad hoc collaborative foraging characteristic of
early humans was a stable adaptive strategy—for a while. In
the hypothesis of Tomasello et al. (2012), it was destabilized
by two essentially demographic factors. First was competition
with other humans. Competition with other humans meant that
a loosely structured group of collaborators had to turn into a
more tightly knit social group in order to protect their way of
life from invaders. The end result was group competition.
Second was increasing population size. As human populations
grew, they tended to split into smaller groupings, leading to
so-called tribal organization in which a number of different
social groupings were still a single super-group or “culture”.
This meant that recognizing others from one’s cultural group
became far from trivial—and of course, one needed to ensure
that one could be recognized by others as well. Such recognition
in both directions was important because only members of one’s
cultural group could be counted on to share one’s skills and
values and so be good and trustworthy collaborative partners,
including for group defense. Contemporary humans have many
diverse ways of marking group identity, but one can imagine
that the original ways were mainly behavioral: people who talk
like me, prepare food like me, and otherwise share my cultural
practices are very likely members of my cultural group.4
Conformity
Early humans’ skills of imitation thus became modern
humans’ active conformity, both to coordinate activities more
effectively with ingroup strangers and to display group iden-
tity so that others will choose me as a knowledgeable and
trustworthy partner. Teaching others the proper way to do
things, perhaps especially one’s children, became a good
way to assist their functioning in the group and to ensure even
more conformity in the process.
Great apes engage in some forms of social learning and
have some forms of behavioral traditions. They differ from
humans in that great ape “culture” is mainly “exploitive” as in-
dividuals socially learn from others who may not even know
they are being watched (in contrast to cooperative human
culture with teaching and conformity; Tomasello, 2011). In
any case, given a relatively simple task—deciding which one
of three holes to insert a ball to get a reward—it turns out that
both chimpanzees and human children are biased to follow the
majority. Individuals of both species were shown a demonstra-
tion in which one individual placed a ball into one of the holes
three times, whereas three other individuals each placed a ball
into a different hole once each. With frequency thus con-
trolled, individuals of both species followed the three individ-
uals, not the one individual (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello,
2012). However, in a follow-up study, subjects first had4In most of what follows, I am thinking about the first human cultures, living
mainly a hunter–gatherer lifestyle, and not contemporary large-scale civil societies
after agriculture.
© 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnsuccess with one of the holes via their own individual learning.
Now, when they saw three demonstrators successful with a
different hole, the species differed in their reaction. Chimpan-
zees continued to use the hole that had been successful for
them in the past—even when the other hole gave a higher
reward—whereas the human children went with the majority
over their own experience (Haun & Tomasello, in press).
Finally, Haun and Tomasello (2011) used the famous Asch
paradigm with 4-year-old human children and found that, like
adults, they also conform to others even when those others are
expressing clearly unreasonable views of things. Also, like
adults, the children conform much more when their behavior
is made in public—the previous demonstrators see and hear
their response—than when it is made in private, suggesting
that indeed they are conforming to peer pressure from the
majority. Although no such study has been carried out with
chimpanzees, Engelmann, Herrmann, and Tomasello (2012)
found that when given the opportunity to engage in either
cooperative or selfish behavior, chimpanzees behaved the same
whether they were being watched by conspecifics or not. In con-
trast, and as expected, 5-year-old children were more prosocial
and less antisocial when they were being watched than when
they were alone. Interestingly and importantly, Engelmann,
Over, Herrmann, and Tomasello (2013) also found that children
of this same age are much more concerned with their reputation
with ingroup members than with outgroup members.
Enforcing Social Norms
And so humans do not just learn from others, they actively con-
form to others, and from early in ontogeny, inways that other pri-
mates do not. This might be based on a desire to fit in with the
group and/or to avoid negative sanctions from group members
who are expecting conformity. The mutual expectations of the
group—that is, standards of behavior that are mutually known
to all and expected by all—are often called social norms. And
these expectations are indeed normative in the sense that those
who deviate will suffer some sort of negative consequence, at
the very least some sort of negative evaluation of their reputation.
And so, it is clear why children grow up following social
norms. But they also—from around 3 years of age—begin
enforcing social norms on others. In this case, it is difficult
to find prudential reasons for their actions, as enforcing social
norms can be risky if the person whose behavior is being
corrected objects or retaliates. Nevertheless, from around
3 years of age, when young children observe someone, for
example, preparing to destroy another person’s piece of artwork,
they object and intervene (Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello,
2011). They do this as well when someone threatens to steal
someone’s property (Rossano, Carpenter, & Tomasello,
2012). Perhaps surprisingly, they even object and intervene
when someone begins playing a novel game in a way that does
not conform to the rules as the child knows them (Rakoczy,
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). In this case, no harm is being
done (the game is an individual game), but children still want to
make sure that others play the game correctly. Young children
thus not only follow but also enforce both moral and con-
ventional norms (where conventional norms, but not moral
norms, are conceived by the children themselves as changeable
if sanctioned by an authority or a different cultural group).Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 187–194 (2014)
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Turiel (1998), Schmidt, Rakoczy, and Tomasello (2012) had
children observe violations of both conventional norms (game
rules) and moral norms (harm producing), and these were
perpetrated by both ingroup and outgroup members. Perhaps
surprisingly, young children enforced moral norms on both
ingroup and outgroup individuals equally, but they enforced
conventional norms on ingroup members only. Thus, even
though they favor their ingroup, young children at the same
time hold them to a higher standard (the so-called black sheep
effect), as outgroup members cannot be expected to know how
“we” do things correctly. Perhaps even more surprising,
Schmidt, Rakoczy, and Tomasello (2013) found that 3-year-olds
even engaged in defending the entitlements of others. That is
to say, when one individual was authorized to do something,
and a second individual objected that she could not do that,
the child intervened against that second person’s objection.
This is a kind of second-order norm enforcement in which
the child objects to an illegitimate objection so as to stand up
for the rights of another person.
One of the most noteworthy characteristics of social norms
is that they are even applied to the self, especially as they are
internalized into feelings of guilt and shame. Evolutionarily,
one may think about guilt and shame as feelings that help an
individual to avoid potentially punishable behavior in the
future by punishing it internally now. But displays of guilt
and shame have a different function; they serve to preempt
others from punishing on the spot (because they feel sympathy
for how bad the guilty person is feeling) and/or judging them to
be either ignorant or disrespectful of the social norm they are
breaking. Guilt and shame displays thus serve an appeasement
and an affiliative function. Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello
(2011) thus looked to see if young children—similar to adults
—judge people differently when they do or do not display guilt
after a transgression. Like adults, even 5-year-old children
showed more positive evaluations of those who expressed
regret for the harm they had caused in comparison to those
who did not.
The question of social norms does not really arise with
great apes, as they do not have the cognitive capacities to
entertain mutually shared expectations. But even on a more be-
havioral level, they are missing a key ingredient. Chimpanzees
will retaliate against those who steal food from them (Jensen
et al., 2007), but they do not intervene or punish an individual
who is attempting to steal food from a third party (even if it is
their kin; Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012). If great
apes do not intervene in situations from a third-party perspec-
tive, then they are not observing social norms, which apply in
an agent-neutral manner to all. Combined with the fact that
they do not seem to care about how others are evaluating them
(Engelmann et al., 2012), they could not be expected to feel
the pressure of social norms or to feel guilty about breaking
them. Social norms, guilt, and shame are uniquely human phe-
nomena, generated, at least in part, by our need to be accepted
by our group.
Group-mindedness
Contemporary human beings thus actively identify with their
cultural group. They conform to its conventions and norms,© 2014. The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnand participate in its social institutions. They feel collective
pride, shame, or guilt if one member of their cultural group
does something especially noteworthy. They become involved
in issues of national and linguistic identity when these become
threatened from political forces. They care about the history of
their culture, as well as its future. In all, on top of their general
skills and inclinations for collaborating with other individuals,
modern human beings are also thoroughly group-minded and
care deeply for their group as an independent entity.IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITION AND MORALITYHumans have thus become ultra-social in twomajor evolutionary
steps: one in which individuals became more collaborative
with one another and another in which individuals became
more identified with their cultural group and its conventions,
norms, and institutions. These new ultra-social ways of life
are notable on their own, but in addition, they are also respon-
sible, in the current hypothesis, for the unique ways in which
human beings (i) think about the world and (ii) relate to one
another not just as social but as moral agents.
It seems obvious that, as compared with other animal spe-
cies, humans think in special ways (see Tomasello, 2014).
First, although great apes and other primates can cognitively
represent situations and entities at least somewhat abstractly,
only humans can conceptualize one and the same situation or
entity under differing, even conflicting, social perspectives
(leading ultimately to a sense of “objectivity”). This perspec-
tival ability results from individuals’ attempts to coordinate
with others during collaborative and communicative interac-
tions (given cognitive processes of shared intentionality).
Second, although many primates make simple causal and in-
tentional inferences about external events, only humans make
socially recursive and self-reflective inferences about others’
or their own intentional states (e.g., she thinks that I think
…). These special kinds of inferences are part and parcel of
humans’ unique forms of cooperative communication in which
individuals must discern “what he intends towards my inten-
tional states.”Third, althoughmany animalsmonitor and evaluate
their own actions with respect to instrumental success,
only humans self-monitor and evaluate their own thinking
with respect to the normative perspectives and standards
(“reasons”) of others or the group. Such social self-monitoring
is responsible for human norms of rationality.
Humans also relate to one another socially in special ways,
some of which are commonly referred to as moral (see
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Thus, as previously noted, obligate
collaborative foraging requires individuals to care about their
potential partners, because their own well-being depends on
those partners. Interdependence breeds altruism. Moreover, if
collaborators have a choice of partners, then it is in the interest
of each individual both to choose her partners wisely and to
make sure that she is perceived as a good cooperative partner
herself. One way of doing this is to do such things as divide
the spoils of a collaborative foraging effort equitably. But indi-
viduals are not being fair and just only to please others strate-
gically, they also judge themselves in the same ways that they
judge others base on values shared in the group—they have aWiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 187–194 (2014)
Ultra-social animal 193conscience. And of course, individuals also appreciate that to
be a good member of the cultural group, one must not only
be helpful and fair, but also one must conform. Human morality
is thus intimately bound up with humans’ ultra-social ways
of being.
Great apes and other primates are highly social, but because
they are not interdependent with one another in the same ways
as humans, they are not prosocial in the same ways as humans;
because they are not obligate collaborative foragers, they do
not deal with issues of distributive justice; and because they
do not identify with their social group, they do not possess a
group-mindedness that leads them to conform to their groups’
conventions and norms as an end in itself. Human morality
represents the internalized interactive processes—both cognitive
and motivational—that structure humans’ ultra-cooperative
ways of living and being.CONCLUSIONH. sapiens is thus “the social animal” in some very specific
ways. Our own view is that humans set off down their ultra-
social, cooperative pathway when some changes in ecological
conditions forced them to become obligate collaborative
foragers. Human individuals became interdependent with one
another in ways that changed not only their social behavior
but also their cognitive processes. Whereas other great apes
engage in complex social interactions and cognitive processes,
in the end, it is all a kind of instrumental rationality aimed at
the individual’s personal gains. Interdependence of the human
variety led humans to put their heads together in acts of shared
intentionality in which they acted on and understood the world
together as a kind of plural subject. Individuals came to feel
commitments and obligations toward one another as they
worked together. They divided the spoils of their collaborative
efforts fairly and justly because they cared about one another,
because they wanted to be perceived as cooperative, and be-
cause they were judging themselves in the same way that they
were judging others. And all of this became even more intense
as individuals came to identify with their cultural group in an
even larger social context of interdependent collaboration.
All of which is to say that calling humans “the social
animal” is accurate but not as precise as it could be. The most
felicitous alternative might be something more specific like
“the cooperative animal” or “the ultra-social animal”. These
phrases would capture more precisely something of the unique
evolutionary trajectory by which humans came to interact with
the world cognitively via species-unique processes of shared
intentionality and to interact with one another socially via
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